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 4.1  Introduction 
 For a number of MENA economies, the barriers to entrepreneurship manifest by the 
unfriendly environment for start-ups and relatively high regulatory and administra-
tive burdens are estimated to be among the highest in the world. Potential investors 
and existing firms in those countries face a complex regulations and licensing 
requirements which are often unclear or inconsistent with international norms. 
Policy, regulatory and institutional distortions, as well as constraints and barriers to 
efficient private sector investment, operations and exit, are then prevalent through-
out the region. Complexity and the rents created by economic distortions breed 
administrative discretion and corruption. The bureaucratic burden is often espe-
cially heavy for small and medium enterprises. Higher levels of government rent 
seeking and/or bureaucratic obstacles to legal firm entry will lead to a greater bifur-
cation of firm sizes – very small informal firms, relatively large formal firms and 
an absence of medium sized formal firms. 
 However, almost all countries in the MENA region entered the new millennium with 
large unemployment rates. In this context, decision makers emphasize the role of efficient 
markets which could lead to higher firm creation rates and thereby, to lower 
unemployment rates. Aside to direct employment effects, high firm creation rates are 
supposed to have a positive impact on the technical and organizational change of econo-
mies because new firms are on average, better equipped with the latest technical and 
organizational knowledge. The structural change of the economy goes hand in hand 
with high firm creation which is believed to be an important channel of GDP growth. 
 Indeed, in addition to expanding the range of products, entry can first create 
more competition, lower prices for consumers, and may lead to better technology 
adoption. Changes in the status of existing firms from informal to formal may also 
have important effects on GDP growth. Indeed, it is likely that informal firms have 
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less secure property rights and thus lower than optimal investment and productivity 
growth, leading to lower profits and value added. Starting a firm with expansive 
potential is finally an option for educated and high-skilled workers. In presence of 
labor market frictions, this additional option can be seen as reducing the probability 
of ending up in a low-wage job and hence, increases the incentives for education. 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section deals with regulations,
upgrading program and business environment in Tunisia. Data used to analyze 
patterns of entry and exit in Tunisian manufacturing industries and their impact on 
firm’s performance are presented in Sect. 4.2. The main shortcomings of the data 
sources constructed for this purpose will also be discussed, and some descriptive 
statistics based on the entry–exit data sets will be presented in order to highlight, 
according to the literature, some stylized facts about entry and exit. The determi-
nants of entry and exit process are discussed in Sect. 4.3. This section focuses on 
the implications that the interdependence between aggregate entry and exit has for 
the analysis of manufacturing industry dynamics in Tunisia. The purpose of the 
forth section is to investigate whether entry and exit of firms affect performance and 
labor productivity. 
 4.2  Regulations, Upgrading Program and Business 
Environment in Tunisia 
 The ability to start a firm is limited by several factors including the burden of 
complying with regulations governing business activity. Excessive governmental 
regulations can provide an incentive to operate in the informal sector, or may pre-
vent some entrepreneurs from operating at all. Based on the data from 85 countries, 
Djankov et al.  (2002) find that the countries with more open access to political 
power, greater constraints on the executive, and greater political rights have less 
burdensome regulation of entry than do the countries with less representative, less 
limited, and less free governments. They also find that “stricter” regulation of entry 
is associated with sharply higher levels of corruption, and a greater relative size of 
the unofficial economy. 
 In a more recent paper Djankov et al.  (2006) create an index of the burden of 
regulation based on average country rankings in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” 
indicators. They find that countries that are in the highest (best) quartile of this 
index grow 2.3 percentage points faster than countries in the lowest (worst) quartile. 
This effect is more than twice the effect on GDP growth of going from the second 
quartile to the highest quartile in terms of primary school enrollment. The authors 
stress that initiative such as a “one-stop shop” for business registration could accel-
erate GDP growth. 
 It also arises from the preceding papers that the magnitude of the effect of lower 
registration costs on firm creations is an empirical issue. Indeed, if the main reason 
that firms choose to be informal is the desire to evade taxes, making registration 
procedures more efficient would likely have little impact. It is also possible that 
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entrepreneurs are able to avoid the excessive regulations through bribes, thus 
effectively reducing the impact of regulation. Finally, it is possible that the most 
important constraint on firm creation in developing countries is the availability of 
credit or other complementary inputs. 
 4.2.1  Tunisian Institutional Context 
 Through a combination of colonial heritage and 1950s development philosophy, 
Tunisia has historically had a highly centralized economic system controlled by the 
government particularly since 1961. The post-independence government pushed 
towards a centrally planned system, although one moderately open to the outside 
economy. The government ran the banking system, transportation, and some of the 
major industries. It controlled import and export of most goods and fixed their 
prices at levels unrelated to either internal or world markets. It also supported the 
industrial sector by investing directly in some existing industrial projects. 
 In May 1964, the National Assembly enacted the expropriation of all foreign-
owned lands, to establish 300 state co-operative farms. By 1969, the collectiviza-
tion rate achieved 90% in the agriculture sector alone. The government also 
promoted the institution of co-operatives in other economic sectors: wholesale and 
retail trade, industry, banking, in addition to the already controlled transports, 
power and mines sectors. 1
 The cooperative experiment only ran for few years (1964–1969) before encoun-
tering unbeatable difficulties. The central planned development strategy came to a 
halt in September 1969. Beginning in the seventies, a new economic policy was put 
in place, consisting in the promotion of the private sector while continuing to sup-
port an expanding public sector. Trade policy continued to strongly protect Tunisian 
manufacturing, but important incentives were also granted to the off-shore sector, 
thus attracting significant domestic and foreign investment to exporting activities, 
mainly to textiles, and resulting in a significant expansion of manufacturing 
exports. 
 The new emphasis in the Tunisian economic planning was on labor intensive 
manufacturing industry, financed by private investors. The new political regime 
pursued the creation of new institutions that would promote the private sector, such 
as the Investment Promotion Agency (API), the Industrial Real Estate Agency 
(AFI), the Centre for export Promotion (CEPEX), and the Fund for Industrial 
Promotion and Investment (FOPRODI), with the aim to streamline and simplify 
industrial policy. 
 The first law offering incentives to foreign investors for the establishment of 
manufacturing industries was promulgated in 1972 (law 72-38). This law granted 
to approved industrial projects a wide range of tax concessions and duty-free 
import of capital equipment, raw materials and semi-processed goods. The new 
units were to produce mainly for export, and this reduced further the linkages with 
the Tunisian economic base. Under this law, foreign investors were exempted from 
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corporate income tax during the first 10 years of operation and, amongst other 
benefits, they were permitted to repatriate profits free of tax. 
 Offshore industrialization was promoted under the decree 73-19, by which API 
was also established and charged to promote new investment opportunities and to 
streamline investment procedures by introducing potential investors to the legisla-
tive mechanisms. More than 500 foreign firms established their production units 
under law 72-38 between 1973 and 1978. 
 FOPRODI was created in 1974 with three important objectives:
 1.  Increasing entrepreneurship by promoting new entrepreneurs in SMEs (deﬁ ned 
as ﬁ rms with capital of up to one million Tunisian Dinars). 
 2.  Helping decentralize manufacturing activities in a country in which these activi-
ties had been highly concentrated in the coastal region in general and its three 
principal cities (Tunis, Sfax, and Sousse) in particular. 
 3.  Lowering country’s persistently high ofﬁ cial unemployment rate (of about 16%). 
 A second industrial investment law was introduced in 1974 (law 74-74), which 
sought to relate incentives more closely to employment creation. The law was also 
intended to encourage Tunisian private investment, which had previously been less 
favored than foreign one. 
 The constitution of industrial zones is also subject to open competition since 
1973, when the government founded the AFI in charge of facilitating the establish-
ment and equipment of such zones. 
 However, the return to a market economy announced by the government was 
less decisive than is appeared to be. Tunisia still maintained extensive price subsi-
dization, the financial sector was entirely administered by the government, and the 
economy was protected through very high customs rights and import restrictions. 
 By the end of the 1970s, Tunisia appeared to be over-dependent on oil revenues, 
having extended its foreign borrowings and showing no stable productive base, 
capable of absorbing excess labor force and of exporting a diversified and competi-
tive range of goods. In particular, the lack of basic state investment in infrastructure 
had blocked growth and deterred private investment. 
 The sixth development plan (1982–1986) was an austerity plan, designed to 
introduce the economic adjustments necessary to prepare Tunisia for an era of 
reduced income from petroleum. Investment was directed towards non-oil indus-
tries, severe controls were maintained on external debt and balance of payments, 
cuts in public investment and consumption were decided,  also though wage freezes 
and import restrictions. 
 Beginning in 1987, the government embarked on a structural adjustment 
program (SAP) which envisaged significant readjustments in the essential instruments
of the economic and financial policy, especially in the fields of taxation, price deter-
mination, foreign trade, public utilities and income policy. One of the targets of the 
program was the reallocation of tasks between the economic players, to be realized 
through the total or partial cession of some public utilities to the benefit of banks, 
parent companies or private individuals. 
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 The SAP strategy was carried out under the Seventh (1987–1991) and the 
Eighth (1992–1996) Development Plans. While the first Plan was intended to 
achieve macro-economic stability and to introduce the initial measures of structural
liberalization, in terms of sectoral, financial and trade reforms, the main orienta-
tion of the second Plan was to increase efficiency and promote market mechanisms
through legislative framework which would encourage foreign investment, 
accelerate privatization, develop the stock market, and deepen integration with 
the European market. 
 The readjustment of the industrial policy was obvious in the new investment 
code, Law 87-51, intended to unify and simplify the investment laws of 1972 and 
1981. The new Code granted several tax and financial incentives, especially to 
wholly exporting industries and was aimed at promoting a major liberalization of 
the Tunisian industrial sector. At the same time, the prior approval of manufactur-
ing investment by the API was removed (since 1987), the three industrial support 
agencies were merged into a single Industrial Promotion Agency, and investment 
undertaking has been greatly facilitated through the establishment of a one-stop 
shop, where all the administrative and legal services involved in the opening of a 
business are gathered. In the case of FDI, there are no restrictions on investment in 
off-shore activities, but the prior approval is still needed for all investment in activi-
ties serving the domestic market. Domestic price deregulation was enacted in 1991 
and a shift from a positive list to a negative list regime was introduced in trade 
policy in 1994. 
 This reform has shortened the delays involved in setting up a company. A unified 
investment incentive code was also put in place in 1993, replacing sectoral codes 
with fiscal and financial incentives varying across economic activities. The new 
code set incentives based on the cross-cutting objectives of exports, regional devel-
opment and acquisition of new technology. The code, designed to unify the existing 
sectoral codes in a “Code Unique,” regulates all productive sectors, except projects 
relating to mining, energy production, finance and foreign trade, which are gov-
erned by specific laws. 
 Thanks to this new legislation, investment in agriculture, manufacturing indus-
tries (excluding the mechanical weaving of rugs and carpets, weapons manufacture, 
the recycling processing of waste and garbage), agribusiness, certain totally export-
ing services and services related to industry, and public works requires no previous 
authorization, but a simple declaration to the competent authority. The incentive 
system includes schemes very favorable to investment, a 10-year tax holiday and 
total exemption from import duties and the value added tax for totally exporting 
projects and generous income tax exemption measures on reinvested income. 
 The Code distinguishes between two categories of investment, offshore, in 
which foreign capital accounts for at least 66% of equity, and at least 80% of the 
production is designed to export, and on-shore, in which foreign equity is limited 
to 49% in non-industrial projects, while industrial projects can reach 100% of 
foreign equity. Additional incentives are provided to off-shore industries or totally 
exporting industries. 
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 With respect to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the Code enlists particular 
incentives under articles 46bis and 47. SMEs in agriculture, industry and services 
can benefit from an equity participation of the State and a grant covering part of the 
expenditures incurred for studies and technical assistance; both benefits are granted 
through the FOPRODI. 
 In 1992, Tunisia approved of a law for geographically bounded free trade zones, 
and the zones of Bizerte (60 km north of Tunis) and Zarzis (450 km south of Tunis) 
were created. They were installed in order to offer an even more favorable environ-
ment for foreign investors. The free trade zone at Zarzis, operational since 1995, is 
specialized in services of the oil sector, and the other one at Bizerte, includes industry
and construction, ship repair and demolition activities, as well as several services. 
The land is state-owned, but managed by a private company. The geographic aspect 
as well as the infrastructure and proximity to the markets give both Bizerte and 
Zarzis a great potential to attract foreign investment into the zones. 
 Some flexibility has also been brought to the labor market since 1994, through 
two important reforms involving firing and the limited duration contract. Prior to 
this law, compensation was left completely to the judge’s decision, which created a 
lot of uncertainty for both employees and employers. This law set a scale limiting 
compensation  between 1 and 2 months per year worked and to a maximum of 3 
years of salary. The limited duration work contract has been generalized since 
1996, regardless of the nature of the work involved. According to a law enacted in 
1996, an employer can conclude with an employee, a work contract for a limited 
duration, provided that the total period of work does not exceed 4 years, including 
renewals. At the end of the 4 year-period, the employer has to either fire the 
employee or grant him the permanent worker status. These reforms of labor legisla-
tion allow both a great deal of employment flexibility and minimum job security 
and compensation in case of firing. 
 In February 1999, the government created the Fonds d’Incitation à l’Innovation 
dans les Technologies de l’Information (FITI) to support small-scale investments 
by the private sector in information technologies. The government cofinances up to 
49% or a maximum of 200,000 TD for information technology projects, if the 
following conditions are met: the project is approved by, and presented to, FITI by 
a venture capital firm (SICAR), and the SICAR commits to provide at least 30% of 
the startup capital of the project; the investor provides at least 2% of the startup 
capital; and FITI’s cofinancing is not higher than the share of the SICAR in the 
startup capital. 
 More recently (November 2003), the Tunisian government launched the 
Industrial Modernization Program 2 (PMI), financed by a European Union donation 
to prepare the country economy enters the free trade area planned by the associa-
tion agreement accord with the European Union, for which final establishment is 
set to 2008. The program has strived to speed up the rate of setting up enterprises 
and to diversify the industrial base. Investment is supported by using modern 
management methods that are underpinned by innovation and through new infor-
mation and communication technologies. Innovation plays a key role in this 
context, since it allows Tunisian companies to position themselves better in relation 
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to other emerging countries. The PMI also provides a technical assistance of a 
more institutional kind in Metrology, Standardization, Industrial Property and the 
access of SMEs to financing. 
 4.2.2  Tunisian Upgrading ( Mise à Niveau ) Program 
 The external outlook for Tunisia changed dramatically in the mid-1990s with the 
Association Agreement with the EU and the phase out of the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangements (MFA). Their implementations will result in a very large fall in 
effective protection for domestic industries and in increased competition on export 
markets. To date, the private sector has assumed a wait-and-see attitude, as indi-
cated by a weak investment performance, particularly in the manufacturing sector 
while sentiment remains positive. However, opportunistic investments have occurred 
to take advantage of temporary distortions in effective protection caused by the 
phased implementation of the EU agreement. 
 A key government initiative to meet the twin competitive challenges of the EU 
agreement and the phasing out of the MFA has been a large program of  Mise à 
Niveau , which includes investment incentives for selected producers in sectors that 
either have had strong export performance in the recent past (textiles and garments, 
and mechanical and electrical products) or that are judged to have good potential 
(agro-processing), to help manufacturing industry adapt and upgrade its methods 
and practices of organization, management, innovation, training, technology, distri-
bution, marketing, communications, and research and development. 
 The  Mise à Niveau Program (PMN), implemented since 1995, includes a num-
ber of projects destined to enterprises and to their environment to allow the produc-
tive system to compete at an international level. It is addressed to the private sector 
enterprises which have a margin of growth, an expanding market and, above all, 
which express the intention to upgrade themselves. The target of this program is to 
restructure 4,000 firms in 10 years, given that enterprises can take advantage of the 
program more than once, if they have promising plans and produce good results. 
 The program is divided into two phases:
 1.  The ﬁ rst one covering the period 1995–2000, is aimed at reinforcing Tunisian 
ﬁ rms ability to face international competition. 
 2.  The second one, covering the period 2001–2005, aims to consolidate the process 
of economic upgrading, extending it to trade and services. 
 To participate in the program, an enterprise must submit a detailed application 
and demonstrate strong growth potential, a good market and promising products at 
existing quality/price ratios that can be improved. Size, industry, and location are 
supposedly not a factor determining acceptance in the program; however, the program
has sectoral targets for participation that reveal an export oriented bias in favor of 
the textile and clothing, and the mechanical and electrical subsectors. 
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 By March 2007, 3,735 firms have joined the program; of these 9 have been 
rejected and 2,489 have received the approval for their plans from the steering com-
mittee involving a total planned investment of 3881 million TD (about 2982 million 
US$), of which 20% was allocated to food processing business, 20% to textiles and 
clothing, 19% to building materials, ceramics and glass products, 16% to mechani-
cal, electric and electronics, 7% to chemicals, 4% to leather, and the remaining 14% 
to unclassified activities. The remaining 1,237 dossiers were still at the diagnostic 
level (cf. Table  4.1 ). 
 Over time, the program has increased its focus on SMEs. The average size of 
investments in the PMN declined from 3 million TD in 1996 to 1.6 million in 2007 
(March). In addition, the share of enterprises with less than 100 employees rose 
from 29% of total enterprises participating in the program in 1996, to almost 2/3 in 
2007 (March). 
 Enterprises that are in financial difficulties are excluded from the PMN, but are 
provided assistance in resolving these problems under the law 95-34 of April 17, 
1995. The law creates a Monitoring Committee called “ Commission de suivi des 
entreprises économiques ” charged to collect information on the activities of enter-
prises and to provide information to the President of First Instance Court, who is 
responsible for administering the bankruptcy law, warning of enterprises in diffi-
culty, and proposing restructuring plans. There is also a Bureau of assistance to 
enterprises whose activities involve three phases of assistance. The first two phases 
are administrative and try to help enterprises reach an agreement with their credi-
tors to continue their operations and, thus, avoid failure. The third phase is judicial 
and seeks to help enterprises to get recapitalized after bankruptcy. No financial sup-
port is provided for the enterprises, but when they are successfully restructured, 
they are eligible for support under the PMN. 
 The government has recently established a PMN for services tied to industry. 
These include the key services that are important in improving the productivity 
and competitiveness of the industrial sector. The service PMN covers business 
services, engineering, informatics, training, agricultural consultants. Other 
important services, such as financial services, telecommunications, electricity, and 
transportation, are already being upgraded under other programs. It is expected 
to function like the PMN for manufacturing enterprises, with similar approval 
procedures and funding from the Fonds de Développement de la Competitivité 
(FODEC). 
 4.2.3  Business Environment in Tunisia 
 4.2.3.1  Starting a Business 
 Reductions in start-up costs can take two forms. One is to reduce the bureaucratic 
hurdles that increase the start-up costs for new firms. The second is to provide 
institutions for venture capital as well as public financial support for new firms. 
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 Table 4.1  Participation to the Mise à Niveau Program – March 2007 
 Food 
processing
 Leather 
and shoes  Chemical 
 Wood, cork, 
furniture and 
diverse 
 Building materials, 
ceramics and glass 
 Mechanical, metal 
works, electric and 
electronics
 Textiles and 
clothing  Total 
 Approved  327  191  137  336  124  303  1,071  2,489 
 Investment amount 
million dinars 
 787  150  264  526  756  630  768  3,881 
 Share of investment by 
sector (%) 
 20  4  7  14  19  16  20  100 
 Immaterial Investment  85  36  34  62  48  100  152  517 
 Share of immaterial 
investment (%) 
 11  24  13  12  6  16  20  13 
 Precede granted  105  24  36  77  76  94  137  549 
 Dossiers at the diagnostic 
level 
 201  74  68  189  115  175  415  1,237 
 Dossiers refused  3  –  1  –  –  5  –  9 
 Total adhesion  531  265  206  525  239  483  1,486  3,735 
Source: Programme de mise à niveau, Ministère de l’Industrie; de l’Energie et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises .  http://www.pmn.nat.tn/www/fr/REPAR_
SECT.ASP 
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 Business registration is relatively fast and efficient in Tunisia when compared 
with countries at similar levels of economic development. It takes ten procedures 
(10.3 in MENA) and only 11 days (40.9 days in MENA) to start up a business. By 
contrast, in Hungary, although the number of procedures is only six, it takes about 
38 days to start up a business. 
 The one-stop shop of the API, which was certified ISO 9002 in June 2000, has 
undoubtedly facilitated business registration and starts up in the manufacturing sector. 
It informs prospective entrepreneurs on the procedures for statistical and tax 
registration, assists with on-line registration, provides 24 h responses to business 
related queries and maintains a detailed database on the registered companies. 
 However, prior authorizations relating to environment, labor and sectoral regulations
are still relatively numerous and impinge on the establishment of new businesses in 
non manufacturing sectors. Delays are also reported in securing finance, land and 
in obtaining the construction permit. If these are added up, the effective period to 
start up a business in Tunisia may exceed 2 years. 
 4.2.3.2  Hiring and Firing Rules 
 In Tunisia, hiring rules are flexible but termination regulations are rigid and too 
protective when compared with its peers. Surveys of managers show that employment
regulation is seen to be a bottleneck to improving efficiency, and thus productivity 
of investment. 
 Indeed, Tunisia compares favorably with other countries in the MENA and 
OECD regions in terms of flexibility in hiring. The legal conditions of employment 
– covering flexibility in working time requirements, mandatory payment for non-
working days, and minimum wage legislation – also compare favorably with the 
selected peers. Labor reforms in Tunisia have introduced flexibility in hiring. The 
1996 revision of the labor code introduced fixed-term contracts, covering by 2001 
about 15% of the labor force. According to the Labor Code, businesses can hire 
workers on part-time or fixed term contracts for any job, without specifying maximum
duration of the contract. 
 However, there are areas where regulatory reform could introduce more flexibility. 
Tunisia restricts the use of fixed contracts, and the use of temporary help agency 
workers is not allowed for example. 
 Flexibility of firing encompasses grounds for dismissal, procedures for dismissal,
notice periods, and severance payments. Compared with other countries in the 
region, Tunisian termination rules seem to be rigid and too protective. 
 Dismissals for economic reasons are still heavily regulated. Companies must 
notify the labor inspector of planned dismissals in writing 1 month ahead, indicating
the reasons and the workers affected. The inspector may propose alternatives to 
layoffs. If these proposals are not accepted by the employer, the case goes to the 
regional tripartite committee of labor inspector, employer organization, and labor 
union ( commission du contrôle des licenciements ). The committee decides by a 
majority vote (if the inspector and union reject the proposal, no dismissal is possible).
It may also suggest retraining, reduced hours, or early retirement. Only 14% of 
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dismissals end up being accepted. As a result, annual layoffs are less than 1% of 
the workforce, compared with more than 10% in the average OCDE country. Yet, 
the unemployment rate remains persistently high, above the OECD average. 
 As a result, private enterprises in Tunisia find it hard to restructure, and small firms 
often find solutions outside the legal framework. In Tunisia, an estimated 38% of 
business activity takes place in the informal sector. International evidence shows that 
heavy labor market regulation encourages entrepreneurs to operate in the informal 
economy. This is also likely to hamper private investment. Indeed, firms in the infor-
mal sector do not operate at full capacity, while their counterparts in the formal sector 
suffer from unfair competition, and may thus not expand capacity at potential. 
 4.2.3.3  Credit Facilities 
 In Tunisia, there exists a public credit bureau ( Centrale de Risques ) established in 
1958, which is supervised by the Central Bank of Tunisia. The length of historical data 
collected is 10 years, on a total of 56,000 credit reports. However, it records only loans 
above a minimum size of 13 605USD, indicating a focus on monitoring systemic risk. 
Fewer regulatory restrictions on credit information sharing will benefit small firms’ 
access to finance the most. In terms of the scope of credit information distribution, only 
positive data is made available in Tunisia – that is, total loans outstanding, assets and 
personal information. Access to credit information is limited to the creditor’s own 
customers. Thus, weaknesses in design makes Tunisia’s public credit registry a less 
valuable tool for lenders than in similar countries. Access of lenders to credit informa-
tion is also hampered by the absence of private credit registries. 
 In deciding whether to extend credit and at what interest rate, lenders need to know 
what share of debt they can recover if the borrower defaults. Collateral laws enable 
firms to use their assets as security to generate capital and strengthen the incentives 
of debtors to repay their loans. By providing creditors with the right to an asset on 
default, collateral also reduces a lender’s costs of screening loan applicants. 
 However, over-collateralization restricts access to credit by the private sector, 
particularly for small firms. The value of collateral depends largely on the ease of 
creating and enforcing security agreements. The value of collateral also depends on 
the efficiency of the insolvency regime, as creditors are concerned about recovering 
collateral if a firm goes bankrupt. Bankruptcy laws define who controls the insolvency 
process, who has rights to the property of a bankrupt firm and with what priority, 
and the efficiency of realizing the rights. In Tunisia, there are no legal protections 
along any of these dimensions. This leads creditors to either increase the price of 
loans to adjust for the additional risk or decrease the amount of loans. 
 4.2.3.4  Enforcing Contracts 
 In Tunisia, there are no requirements to appoint a lawyer or initiate a protest proce-
dure before a public notary. The creditor files a claim in a court, and the court issues 
a summons to the debtor. The recovery of overdue small debts is normally achieved by 
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means of a special procedure called “ injonction de payer ” before a general-jurisdiction
judge. Provided that the debt has proven an established, the judge grants the 
injunction to pay. The debtor cannot oppose the order. Therefore, the civil lawsuit 
excludes the usual stages of service of process, opposition, hearing and gathering 
of the evidence. This simplified procedure for small debt recovery, which does not 
mandate legal representation, helps reduce the legal costs which amount to 17% of 
the total enforcement cost. 
 4.2.3.5  Closing a Business 
 In Tunisia, the bankruptcy process is short. It takes 1.3 years, shorter than in coun-
tries in the MENA region and in OECD. Moreover, the bankruptcy process is not 
as costly as it is in peer countries. It represents about 7% of estate, compared to 
12.1% in the MENA region. 
 The Tunisian jurisdiction, like many other jurisdictions of French-legal origin, 
has attempted to reach the goals of insolvency by giving broader powers to the 
court. But evidence shows that expanding court powers in bankruptcy proceedings 
do not have the desired effects. 
 Involving creditors and other stakeholders in the insolvency process is important 
to preserve absolute priority of creditors’ claims. In Tunisia, the bankruptcy report is 
filed only with the court and is not accessible to creditors. Such a report would inform 
the creditors and provide a higher chance of maintaining absolute priority. Another 
set of judicial procedures defines the powers of various stakeholders in formulating 
and adopting a rehabilitation plan. The Tunisian bankruptcy law mandates the formu-
lation of a plan by the court, without the effective participation of creditors or man-
agement. Adopting a rehabilitation plan without considering their views does not help 
achieve the insolvency goal of preserving the value of creditor’s claims. 
 4.3  Firm Demographics Data in Tunisia: Some Stylized Facts 
 The purpose of this section is to describe the data used to analyse patterns of entry 
and exit in Tunisian manufacturing industries. Some descriptive statistics based on 
the entry–exit data sets will be presented in order to highlight, according to the 
literature, some stylised facts about entry and exit. 
 4.3.1  Data Sources 
 Two sources of information are used to build manufacturing entry and exit 
database. The first comes from administrative files including the National 
Repertory of firms in Tunisia, which is based on continuous report of fiscal 
854 Entry, Exit, and Productivity in Tunisian Manufacturing Industries
affiliation of firms. The main advantage of administrative data set rest in the 
full coverage of the business registers of firms’ population in the Tunisian 
Manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, this data set has also some important 
weaknesses such as the accuracy of information of exitors by year and for each 
industry, and the lack of information on the characteristics of entrants/exitors, 
except industry affiliation. 
 To circumvent these weaknesses, an additional source of administrative file 
related to the quarterly register of employees taken from the Tunisian National 
Social Security Fund (CNSS) is used; it constitutes a valuable database of private 
firm affiliates. At the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (INS), this second 
source is merged with firms’ fiscal register. 3 The database constituted will serve as 
a basis for computing series on the number of entering (new), exiting (out of busi-
ness) and total firms with ten workers or more, by year and by industry over the 
period 1996–2004. 
 4.3.2  Characteristics of Entry and Exit Process of Firms 
 A considered manufacturing firm is assumed in business, if it has a positive number 
of employees. The entry–exit data set contains three basic variables:
 • T 
 it  : Total Numbers of firms active in the  i th industry at the end of period  t . 
 • E 
 it  : Number of new firms that entered the  i th industry in year  t . 
 • X 
 it  : Number of firms that exited the  i th industry in year  t . 
 For comparability across sectors, entry and exit rates are defined with respect to 
the current year’s stock of establishments:
 • 
-
=
1
Entry rate in it
it
E
t
T
 
 • 
-
=
1
Exit rate in it
it
X
t
T
 Turnover = Entry rate + exit rate • 
 Net entry rate = Entry rate – exit rate • 
 Fact 1: Sizeable firm turnover in all manufacturing industries 
 Our data confirm a relative high firm churning in all sectors. In Fig.  4.1 , we 
present average annual entry and exit rates over the period 1996–2004, for the 
considered 15 manufacturing industries. Total firm turnover involves 4–12% of 
all firms in most manufacturing industries and more than 12% in three sectors: 
31.4% in textile industries, 14.4% in wood products and 12.4% in leather and 
footwear industries. 
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 Over the sample period (1996–2004), we have an annual average exit rate of 
2.3%, which is comparable to exit rates found in other developing regions. For 
instance, Clerides et al.  (1998) report annual average exit rates for Colombia of 
1.7%, for Morocco of 3.7% and for Mexico of 1.5%. The entry rate in our sample 
is much higher, on average 8% per year. This compares to entry rates of 2.7%, 4.9% 
and 4.8% reported for Colombia, Morocco and Mexico respectively. The higher 
entry rates in the Tunisian economy are not that surprising, taking into account that 
the entry of new firms was an important component of the restructuring process 
concerning the manufacturing industries since 1995. 
 The data confirm previous findings that, in all sectors, net entry is far less 
important than the gross flows of entry and exit that generate it (cf. Fig.  4.2 and 
Table  4.2 ). This suggests that the entry of new firms in the market is largely 
 Fig. 4.1  Firm turnover rate in manufacturing industries, mean 1996–2004 
 Fig. 4.2  Average net entry by sectors, 1996–2004 
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driven by a search process rather than augmenting the number of competitors 
in the market. 
 Fact 2: Firm turnover is principally driven by small and medium sized firms 
 An important step in the analysis of creative destruction consists of looking at 
the distribution of firm by size across industries. Size is a crucial dimension in the 
analysis of firm entry and exit for several reasons. Small firms seem to be affected 
by greater mixing, but also have greater potential for expansion. Thus, a distribution 
of firms skewed towards small units may imply higher entry and exit, but also 
greater post entry growth of successful firms. Alternatively, it may point to a sec-
toral specialization of the given country towards newer industries, where mixing 
tends to be larger and more firms experiment with different technologies. 
 However, any observed difference in one single indicator, like firm size, cannot, 
as such, be taken to indicate differences in the magnitude or characteristics of 
creative destruction. The distribution of firm by size is likely to be influenced by 
the overall dimension of the internal market as well as the business environment in 
which firms operate that can discourage firm expansion. So, the analysis of firm 
size should be taken as one of the important aspects that, together with the others 
on firm demographics, will enable to identify a coherent story about cross-sectoral 
differences in creative destruction. 
 Size seems to be an important dimension in the analysis of firm entry and exit 
in Tunisian manufacturing industries. Not surprisingly, small firms (fewer than 
60 employees in average) account for more than 75% of total firm turnover 
 Table 4.2  Firm turnover rate in manufacturing industries, mean 1996–2004 
 Code  Industry  Entry rate  Exit rate  Turnover 
 15  Food industries  0.073  0.038  0.111 
 17  Textile industries  0.260  0.054  0.314 
 18  Clothing and lining industries  0.038  0.020  0.058 
 19  Leather and footwear industries  0.097  0.026  0.124 
 20  Wood products  0.107  0.037  0.144 
 24  Chemical industries  0.036  0.013  0.049 
 25  Plastics material and rubber industries  0.078  0.012  0.091 
 26  Mineral non metallic products  0.061  0.016  0.077 
 27  Metallurgy  0.037  0.026  0.063 
 28  Fabricated metal products  0.063  0.018  0.081 
 29  Machinery and equipment  0.047  0.014  0.061 
 21–22  Paper and cardboard industries, printing 
and related support activities 
 0.036  0.008  0.044 
 30–33  Electrical equipment, radio and TV and 
other communications equipment, 
Measuring and medical instruments 
 0.101  0.018  0.119 
 34–35  Motor vehicle manufacturing, other 
transportation equipment 
 0.080  0.009  0.089 
 36–37  Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.080  0.029  0.109 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
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 Table 4.3  Average workers per exiting ﬁ rm 
 Code  Average size  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
 15  Food industries  25  21  26  16  33  19  19  15  13 
 17  Textile industries  51  85  53  51  60  66  40  63  41 
 18  Clothing and lining industries  59  68  54  43  63  80  56  99  111 
 19  Leather and footwear industries  45  39  65  10  100  42  42  25  24 
 20  Wood products  13  37  27  25  36  62  43  96  14 
 24  Chemical industries  26  32  –  21  59  15  53  14  22 
 25  Plastics material and rubber Industries  11  –  12  33  13  25  –  23  – 
 26  Mineral non metallic products  15  24  87  30  21  69  15  15  109 
 27  Metallurgy  –  126  13  31  25  14  48  –  – 
 28  Fabricated metal products  21  21  42  29  31  26  49  42  13 
 29  Machinery and equipment  15  63  88  22  17  18  13  –  70 
 21–22  Paper and cardboard industries, printing and related support 
activities 
 29  –  13  44  –  –  43  –  24 
 30–33  Electrical equipment, radio and TV and other communications 
equipment, measuring and medical instruments 
 –  19  127  47  224  52  70  114  17 
 34–35  Motor vehicle manufacturing, other transportation equipment  –  –  –  16  53  –  –  18  – 
 36–37  Miscellaneous manufacturing  30  17  27  40  45  23  125  159  30 
 All industries  28  46  49  30  56  39  47  57  41 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
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 Table 4.4  Average workers per ﬁ rm entrants 
 Code  Average size  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
 15  Food industries  30  27  32  22  23  23  27  23  27 
 17  Textile industries  53  59  51  51  51  41  61  45  53 
 18  Clothing and lining industries  64  77  68  75  93  72  134  79  42 
 19  Leather and footwear industries  50  99  93  41  65  26  53  70  75 
 20  Wood products  18  21  17  26  20  22  27  30  21 
 24  Chemical industries  53  39  14  56  32  23  23  18  50 
 25  Plastics material and rubber Industries  27  25  47  31  42  27  22  36  23 
 26  Mineral non metallic products  69  33  49  49  42  31  26  23  18 
 27  Metallurgy  25  15  12  20  153  31  127 
 28  Fabricated metal products  30  33  20  21  18  18  22  19  50 
 29  Machinery and equipment  15  36  33  22  21  31  16  68  36 
 21–22  Paper and cardboard industries, printing and related support 
activities 
 25  18  39  33  29  19  21  16  18 
 30–33  Electrical equipment, radio and TV and other communications 
equipment, measuring and medical instruments 
 71  146  113  66  155  56  101  46  37 
 34–35  Motor vehicle manufacturing, other transportation equipment  11  62  215  75  374  64  13  150  81 
 36–37  Miscellaneous manufacturing  50  31  70  39  24  33  37  16  31 
 All industries  39  48  58  42  76  34  41  51  40 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
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 Table 4.5  Average workers per active ﬁ rm 
 Code  Average size  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
 15  Food industries  47  54  54  65  55  49  50  50  50 
 17  Textile industries  87  66  44  115  119  120  111  96  84 
 18  Clothing and lining industries  85  97  99  78  59  57  62  76  92 
 19  Leather and footwear industries  60  66  63  63  66  72  76  77  74 
 20  Wood products  33  32  40  73  42  42  44  38  33 
 24  Chemical industries  113  89  79  78  80  80  85  58  67 
 25  Plastics material and rubber Industries  60  57  57  61  60  59  66  63  60 
 26  Mineral non metallic products  83  75  73  58  78  72  79  77  74 
 27  Metallurgy  125  114  111  123  129  132  104  92  85 
 28  Fabricated metal products  54  55  51  268  54  50  46  43  45 
 29  Machinery and equipment  65  46  46  63  42  44  53  53  48 
 21–22  Paper and cardboard industries, printing and related support 
activities 
 59  58  61  42  48  45  51  49  49 
 30–33  Electrical equipment, radio and TV and other 
communications equipment, Measuring and medical 
instruments
 112  147  131  140  145  135  141  153  158 
 34–35  Motor vehicle manufacturing, other transportation 
equipment
 113  118  147  120  93  86  89  89  97 
 36–37  Miscellaneous manufacturing  72  65  54  20  85  96  97  97  82 
 All industries  78  76  74  91  77  76  77  74  73 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
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(cf. Tables  4.3 – 4. 6 ) and firm turnover tend generally to decline with average size. 
However, this is not completely true for measuring and medical instruments indus-
tries, where relatively high turnover (11.9%) and medium average size (84) are 
jointly observed. This suggests a possible role of the business environment that 
reduces firm dynamics among medium-sized businesses. 
 It is also interesting to look at the dispersion of firm by size within each sub-
sector. Table  4.7 presents average within coefficient of variation of firm size, nor-
malized by the overall manufacturing sector coefficient of variation 4 . If technological 
factors were predominant in determining the heterogeneity of firm size across sec-
tors, the values should be concentrated around one. If, on the contrary, the size 
differences were explained mainly by sectoral factors inducing a consistent bias 
within sectors, then we would expect the sub-sectors with an overall value above 
(below) the average to be characterized by values generally above (below) one in 
the sub-sectors. 
 Textile (17), Chemical (24), Mineral non metallic products (26) and Fabricated 
Metal Products (28) industries display greater within-industry dispersion in firm 
size. This is due to the fact that in particular, in textile industries small businesses 
coexist with large multi-plant enterprises. 
 The relatively high turnover rates amongst small-medium sectors suggest that 
the process of entry and exit involves a proportionally low number of workers. 
For most sectors, new firms are only 32–63%, the average size of incumbents 
 Table 4.6  Average size of exitors and entrants, 1996–2004 
 Exitors  Entrants 
 Code 
 Average 
size
 Share in 
total 
exit 
(%) 
 Average 
exit 
rate
(%)
 Average 
size
 Share in 
total
entry
(%)
 Average 
entry
rate
(%)
 15  21  20.7  3.8  26  12.9  7.3 
 17  57  26.4  5.4  52  36.6  26.0 
 18  70  20.9  2.0  78  12.6  3.8 
 19  43  5.5  2.6  63  6.3  9.7 
 20  39  2.7  3.7  22  2.7  10.7 
 24  30  2.1  1.3  34  2.0  3.6 
 25  20  1.4  1.2  31  3.0  7.8 
 26  43  4.5  1.6  38  5.5  6.1 
 27  43  1.1  2.6  55  0.5  3.7 
 28  30  4.0  1.8  25  4.5  6.3 
 29  38  1.3  1.4  31  1.4  4.7 
 21–22  31  1.3  0.8  24  1.8  3.6 
 30–33  84  2.9  1.8  88  5.0  10.1 
 34–35  29  0.4  0.9  116  1.1  8.0 
 36–37  55  4.7  2.9  37  4.1  8.0 
 All  industries  44  100  2.3  48  100  8.0 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
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 Table 4.8  Average size of entrants and exitors in proportion of 
incumbents average size, 1996–2004 
 Average size/Incumbents average size (%) 
 Sectors  Entrants  Exitors 
 15  49.3  39.3 
 17  55.1  60.5 
 18  99.9  89.7 
 19  92.6  63.4 
 20  53.8  94.1 
 24  41.9  37.2 
 25  51.4  32.3 
 26  50.7  57.3 
 27  48.4  38.0 
 28  34.4  40.9 
 29  60.4  74.7 
 21–22  47.3  59.6 
 30–33  62.6  59.6 
 34–35  109.7  27.4 
 36–37  49.5  74.0 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
 Table 4.7  Within-industry coefﬁ cient of variation of ﬁ rm size 
 Sectors  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Average 
 15  1.15  0.94  1.05  1.06  0.98  0.79  0.83  0.97 
 17  1.30  1.36  1.29  1.24  1.06  0.93  0.90  1.16 
 18  0.58  0.59  0.59  0.65  0.69  0.67  0.59  0.62 
 19  0.82  0.78  0.95  1.15  0.98  0.91  0.92  0.93 
 20  0.64  0.74  0.61  0.64  0.64  0.56  0.72  0.65 
 24  0.80  1.13  1.15  1.24  1.25  1.14  0.99  1.10 
 25  0.84  0.81  0.84  0.86  0.77  0.89  0.84  0.84 
 26  0.90  0.88  1.08  1.68  1.37  1.17  0.80  1.13 
 27  0.56  0.64  0.76  0.25  0.62  0.93  0.75  0.64 
 28  0.83  1.17  1.18  0.89  1.19  1.42  1.06  1.10 
 29  1.46  0.95  1.30  1.01  0.94  1.03  0.75  1.06 
 21–22  0.98  1.05  1.02  1.00  0.96  1.00  0.97  1.00 
 30–33  1.18  1.20  1.21  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.94 
 34–35  0.92  0.88  0.90  0.87  0.91  0.92  0.95  0.91 
 36–37  0.83  0.85  0.68  0.73  0.70  0.63  1.25  0.81 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
(cf. Table  4. 8 ). The relatively low entry and exit costs may increase incentives to 
start up relatively small businesses in Tunisian manufacturing industries. 
 Fact 3: The creative destruction process is the predominant factor driving entry 
and exit in many manufacturing industries 
 It is interesting to compare entry and exit rates across sectors to test two competing
conjectures: one hypothesis is that entry and exit rates at the sectoral level are 
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mostly driven by sectoral shocks. Sectors with positive profit shocks will have high 
entry and sectors with negative profit shocks will have high exit. If sectoral profit 
shocks are the predominant source of variation, then the cross-sectional correlation 
between entry and exit rates should be negative. Alternatively, entry and exit rates 
at the sectoral level might be driven by the within sector creative destruction 
process. A sector with a high dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks and/or low barriers 
to entry and exit will exhibit both high entry and high exit rates. If the creative 
destruction process is the predominant factor driving entry and exit, then the cross-
sectional correlation of entry and exit should be positive. 
 As indicated in  Table  4. 9 , there is a high correlation of industry-level entry 
rates with exit rate (coefficient of correlation 0.75 for all industries), suggesting 
that firm turnover not only account for the life cycle of different industries, but 
also for a continuous process of reallocation of resources in which new businesses 
(firms) displace obsolete units. The correlation is particularly high in Fabricated 
Metal Products (0.83), Clothing and Lining (0.81), Wood Products (0.75) and 
Textile Industries (0.60). Conversely, weaker correlation of entry and exit rates 
across industries is observed in five industries: Paper and Cardboard, Printing and 
related support activities (0.001), Chemical (−0.07), Motor vehicle manufactur-
ing and other transportation equipment (−0.09), Food Industries (0.20) and 
Plastics material and rubber Industries (−0.25); this weaker correlation seems to 
 Table 4.9  Correlation between entry and exit rate, 1996–2004 
 Code  Industry 
 Correlation between 
entry and exit rate 
 15  Food industries  0.203 
 17  Textile industries  0.601 
 18  Clothing and lining industries  0.807 
 19  Leather and footwear industries  0.342 
 20  Wood products  0.745 
 24  Chemical Industries  −0.066 
 25  Plastics material and rubber Industries  −0.226 
 26  Mineral non metallic products  0.390 
 27  Metallurgy  0.548 
 28  Fabricated metal products  0.831 
 29  Machinery and equipment  0.376 
 21–22  Paper and cardboard industries, printing and related support 
activities 
 0.001 
 30–33  Electrical equipment, radio and TV and other 
communications equipment, Measuring and medical 
instruments
 0.246 
 34–35  Motor vehicle manufacturing, other transportation 
equipment
 −0.091 
 36–37  Miscellaneous manufacturing  −0.499 
 All industries  0.749 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS data 
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be largely due to the systemic changes in which some over-populated industries 
shrank while expanded. 
 4.4  Determinants of Entry and Exit 
 The theoretical and empirical literature addressing the dynamics of entry and exit 
is considerable and uses a variety of terms to refer to it, such as turnover, turbulence, 
mobility, and market selection intensity. In the present section, the term turnover is 
used to refer to the sum of entry and exit rates in a specific industry. Turnover as a 
market selection process restructures industries, relocates their confines and 
changes the foundations of competition. It is not surprising, therefore, to find so 
many papers investigating the reasons behind the inflows and outflows of firms. 
Yet, the only studies that are of interest in this section are those that analyse the 
determinants of the rates of entry and exit in manufacturing industries. It focuses 
on the implications that the interdependence between aggregate entry and exit has 
for the analysis of manufacturing industry dynamics in Tunisia. 
 4.4.1  Theoretical Background 
 Studies of entry and exit have shown that the factors underlying these phenomena 
are very diverse, being related with industry-specific and firm-specific causes, as 
well as with changes in the macroeconomic and political environment. Turnover is 
therefore fed by a variety of factors occurring at the firm, market and macroeco-
nomic levels, which can be either momentary or persistent over time. 
 Various studies suggest that different stages of the cycle yield different regularities 
in entry and exit rates. A series of empirical studies has shown that entry rates are higher 
than exit rates in the earlier phases of industry life cycle (Agarwal  1997 ; Agarwal and 
Audretsch  2001 ; Klepper and Simons  2005) . As industries age and set standards, the 
focus of innovative activity switches from product to process, opportunities for scale 
economies emerge and shakeout begins. Exit rates overtake entry rates and turnover 
levels decrease. The important conclusion emerging from these studies is that levels of 
turnover are higher in earlier stages of the industry or product life cycle. 
 However, the high correlation between the rates of entry and exit found in 
different countries and periods suggests that these are not isolated phenomena. In 
our context, for example, the correlation between the annual rates of entry and 
exit in the Tunisian manufacturing industry is 0.75. Also, as the detail of Table  4. 9
shows, in most of the Tunisian manufacturing sectors, the correlations over the 
period of analysis defining our data set are effectively positive and significant. 
Modeling the empirical behavior of these variables, therefore requires some form 
of interrelation in the econometric specifications. Following the influential paper 
by Shapiro and Khemani  (1987) , this is usually done in two ways: via the error 
terms, maintaining certain symmetry in the vector of explanatory variables, i.e. 
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estimating a system of seemingly unrelated regressions; or via the explanatory 
variables, including entry and exit, i.e. estimating a simultaneous equations 
model. These two approaches have become a benchmark and are the starting 
point for our empirical investigation. 
 4.4.1.1  Entry, Exit, and Symmetry Hypothesis 
 One possible explanation for the statistical regularities around the rates of entry and 
exit is that their determinants are in fact the same. This would imply perfect sym-
metry in the vector of explanatory variables. In empirical works, however, it is 
common to employ a weak version in which only some of the regressors are the 
same and allow for correlation between the error terms of the entry and exit equa-
tions. These regressors are “common” (structural or behavioral) barriers in the 
sense that they affect both entry and exit. 
 Well-known examples of these barriers are assets that, because of their specific-
ity and durability, become sunk costs. On the one hand, investing in such assets is 
a requirement for entry and, if the potential entrant effectively becomes an incum-
bent, the investment eventually becomes a discouragement to exit. On the other 
hand, these barriers to exit can also raise barriers to entry because they can alter the 
expectations of the potential entrants directly by increasing the discount factor of 
the expected benefits; and/or indirectly as a form of signaling that incumbents will 
behave aggressively against the entrants. 
 The hypothesis of symmetry is usually tested by using seemingly unrelated 
regressions system specifications ( SUR ). Statistically significant coefficients for the 
barriers to exit (respectively entry) included in the entry (respectively exit) equation 
would support accepting this hypothesis. 
 4.4.1.2  Entry, Exit, and Simultaneity Hypothesis 
 An alternative or complementary explanation is that entry and exit are interrelated 
in a Schumpeterian setting of creative destruction process. The entry of new, sup-
posed more efficient, firms in a market causes the exit of the relatively less efficient 
producers and there is consequently a displacement effect. However, existing firms 
leave behind an emptiness of resources and sets of unsatisfied customers that are an 
appealing carrot for potential entrants. This may change the subjective probability of 
success for the potential entrants to the extent that they may indeed, decide to enter 
and replace those who have left. The outcome of these opposite effects is known in 
the literature as the revolving door phenomenon or the negative feedback model. 
 However, what we observe really is not necessarily a creative destruction, but 
simply trial and error processes. Indeed, some industries may have higher or lower 
rates than others, just because of their idiosyncratic characteristics. If that is the 
case, the relation between entry and exit is mostly due to fluctuations in demand, 
as in the market size model of Geroski and Mazzucato  (2001) . Changes in the size 
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of the markets are finally responsible for the success or failure of many firms and 
for movements on the fringes of industries. Therefore, industry turnover is not 
necessarily due to displacement-vacuum effects. 
 The displacement/replacement effects would be supported by statistically significant 
coefficients of the entry and exit variables on the right hand side of the exit and entry 
equations, respectively. Otherwise, the natural churning view would be accepted. 
 4.4.2  Econometric Specifications and Results 
 Following Shapiro and Khemani  (1987) , the basic model of entry or exit is 
characterized by:
 ( )=Entry or exit Barriers toentry/exit; incentives; interaction entry/exit;controlsf
 where entry (exit) are measured typically as the number of entry (exit) or the entry 
(exit) rate. 
 Barriers to entry/Exit and/or strategic actions ( BARRIERS ) is a vector and 
usually represented by generally time-invariant vectors of structural characteristics 
of the industry (minimum efficient scale, advertising, R&D, capital intensity, sunk 
costs etc.) that are considered to deter entry or exit. The literature on entry barriers 
emphasizes that there are market conditions that allow incumbents to raise prices 
above costs persistently without attracting entry. The distinctive element of entry 
barriers is that they create an asymmetry between incumbents and potential new 
entrants. Barriers to entry are rents derived from incumbency which impose an 
entry cost to entrants, which incumbents do not have to pay. 
 Exit barriers in turn, make it more difficult for incumbents to exit the markets (e.g., 
sunk costs). A number of contributions have asserted that barriers to exit are related 
to barriers to entry, that is they create mobility barriers. The basic idea behind this 
assert is that exit barriers increase the costs of exit, and thus create a zone of inaction 
where entrants are less likely to enter and incumbents less likely to exit. This suggests 
that a simple distinction between entry and exit barriers is not easily possible. 
However, this type of modeling has also drawbacks. Caves  (1998) for example, points 
out that the inclusion of concentration variables and price cost margins as separate 
regressors  the risk of adding redundancy if one accepts the view proposed by the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm where structural characteristics constrain 
the number of firms in the market and lead to an equilibrium characterized by con-
centration. Structural and strategic entry barriers may also introduce a difficulty, 
insofar as they are different in one specific characteristic. As noted by Roberts and 
Thompson  (2003) , strategic entry barriers are essentially an ex-ante phenomenon, 
while structural entry barriers are both ex-ante and ex-post phenomena. 
 The incentives ( INCENTIVES ) vector captures changing market conditions that 
create opportunities for new entrants. Two typical variables commonly considered 
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are profits and industry growth. While the effect of the latter is not unambiguously 
to foster entry and to reduce exit, the sign of profits as price-cost margins is more 
ambiguous (Caves,  1998 ; Roberts and Thompson  2003) . 
 The interaction entry/exit refers to the intertemporal relationship between entry 
and exit. Roberts and Thompson  (2003) among others provide a study of the interac-
tion between entry and exit which can encompass a number of cases: (1) displace-
ment, where the entry of firms leads to the exit of firms, (2) replacement, where the 
exit of a firm opens room for the entry of new firms, (3) demonstration, where entry 
leads to more entry via a demonstration effect, (4) shakeout, where wave of entry is 
followed by a wave of exit, this leads to a revolving door hypothesis, where the 
simultaneous entry of firms leads to the subsequent exit of the same firms. 
 Beside industry characteristics, variables related to firm or sector specific char-
acteristics can also be included ( CONTROLS ). This is usually done in order to study 
the post-entry performance of new firms. 
 Bearing in mind these considerations, the following relations between entry and 
exit were estimated where in all models the dependent variables are the natural logs 
of the gross rates of entry and exit, calculated after adding 1 to the number of 
entries and exits in each sector  i and period  t to avoid the indeterminacy caused by 
zero entry and exit: 
 Model 1: Symmetry
 ( ) λ+ = + +
, , , ,
Ln 1 ( ; ; )i t i t i t i i tEntry f BARRIERS INCENTIVES CONTROLS u  
 ( ) µ+ = + +
, , , ,
Ln 1 ( ; ; )i t i t i t i i tExit g BARRIERS INCENTIVES CONTROLS v  
Model 2: Simultaneity
 
( )
λ
+ =
+ + +
, , ,
, ,
Ln 1 ( ; ; ;
Ln( 1))
i t i t i t
i t i i t
Entry f BARRIERS INCENTIVES CONTROLS
Exit u  
 
( )
υ
+ =
+ + +
, , ,
, ,
Ln 1 ( ; ; ;
Ln( 1))
i t i t i t
i t i i t
Entry g BARRIERS INCENTIVES CONTROLS
Entry u
 The considered explanatory variables are as follows:
 Structural barriers and strategic actions ( • BARRIERS ):
 Entry barriers include market structure and capital requirements. These are • 
approximated, respectively, by an index of concentration  CR4 and the average 
gross investment accounted in the sector  GROSSI . 
 Exit barriers are reduced to sunk costs, which we proxy with the average investment 
per worker  SUNKC .
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 Incentives ( • INCENTIVES ): 
Incentives are approximated by the export propensity  • EXPROP corresponding to 
the value of exports as a proportion of manufacturers’ value added, the rate of 
profit at the industry level  PROFIT approximated by the proportion of gross oper-
ating surplus, calculated from the value added at factor cost less the labor factor 
costs, to value added, the labor productivity  LPROD defined as the ratio of real 
value added to total employees and the industry labor growth rate  LABORGR .
 Sector specific characteristics ( • CONTROLS ): 
Sectoral characteristics considered are the coefficient of variation of labor size •
CVSIZE and production  CVPROD , measured as the ratio of the standard deviation 
of labor size and production to the mean of labor size and production respectively. 
 Tables  4. 10 and  4. 11 show the results under the symmetry hypothesis (Model 1). 
If we focus on the statistically significant estimates for the whole sector, we find 
that in general, the signs are in conformity with the predictions. According to these 
estimates, industry concentration index and capital requirements constitute important
 Table 4.10  Determinants of entry rate 
 Model 1 a  Model 2 a
Constant  0.17  0.14 
 (3.28)  (4.88) 
CR4  −0.26  −0.26 
 (−3.4)  (−2.61) 
GROSSI(-1)  −0.03  −0.03 
 (−1.51)  (−1.93) 
LABORGR  0.03  0.04 
 (0.94)  (1.27) 
PROFIT  −0.09  −0.10 
 (−2.11)  (−3.43) 
EXPROP  0.01  0.01 
 (2.47)  (2.07) 
CVSIZE  0.02  0.02 
 (2.82)  (3.21) 
CVPROD  0.00  0.00 
 (−0.02)  (0.36) 
LPROD  2.85  3.09 
 (1.98)  (1.96) 
LOGEXIT  –  0.69 
 (3.4) 
 Adjusted  R ²  0.69  0.71 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998–2003; Cross-sections 
included: 15 
a
 Estimation method: Panel least squares; White cross-section
standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected); Effects 
specification: cross-section fixed (dummy variables) and 
period fixed (dummy variables);  t -statistics in parenthesis 
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barriers to entry. As for exits, sunk costs approximated by the average investment 
per worker, act as barrier. However, we find no evidence of symmetry in the vector 
of explanatory variables. 
 A barrier, which gives major advantages for the incumbents, is the realization of 
scale economies which act as a barrier for the entrants principally via an absolute 
capital requirement effect (past GROSSI and SUNKC). Absolute capital require-
ments effect arises from the large investment outlays necessary to build an appro-
priate sized plant. The size of the disadvantage so created depends on the absolute 
size of minimum efficient plants. The imperfections in capital markets, which affect 
the availability of finances (credit) for investments, add to the disadvantage of the 
entrants. Dixit  (1981) has discussed the use of investment as an entry barrier. 
This materializes when capital expenditures once made, become irreversible or 
sunk in the next period. Then an established firm might be able to commit to 
producing an output that it could not sustain at equilibrium if its first period expen-
diture were irreversible. Sunk expenditure lowers the incumbent’s marginal cost for 
any output below the full capacity level, which, in turn discourages the firm from 
cutting output in response to entry. Dixit also shows that potential entry may 
encourage an incumbent firm to invest more in irreversible capital which has the 
 Table 4.11  Determinants of exit rate 
 Model 1 a  Model 2 a
Constant  0.04  0.03 
 (2.19)  (2.24) 
SUNKC  −4.94  −5.38 
 (−2.17)  (−2.46) 
LABORGR  −0.01  −0.01 
 (−1.36)  (−2.16) 
PROFIT  0.00  0.01 
 (0.17)  (0.63) 
EXPROP  0.00  0.00 
 (0.35)  (−0.23) 
CVSIZE  0.00  0.00 
 (0.57)  (0.2) 
CVPROD  −0.01  −0.01 
 (−2.45)  (−2.52) 
LPROD  0.49  0.20 
 (1.47)  (0.69) 
LOGENTRY  –  0.10 
 (3.71) 
 Adjusted  R ²  0.53  0.56 
 Sample (adjusted): 1998–2003 Cross-sections included: 15 
a
 Estimation method: Panel least squares; White cross-section 
standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected); Effects specifi-
cation: cross-section fixed (dummy variables) and period fixed 
(dummy variables);  t -statistics in parenthesis 
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effect of increasing the incumbent’s post entry equilibrium output, while lowering 
the entrant’s post entry equilibrium output and price. Sunk costs are a barrier that 
permits the incumbents to act strategically and forces the entrant to operate at a 
large scale in order to make profits. Capital investment can be an effective entry 
deterrent in the above model even if the potential entrant has the same cost function 
as the incumbent or even if the entrant has lower cost. This is because the extent to 
which costs are sunk plays an important strategic role in permitting the established 
firm to commit to a level of output that it would maintain if entry were to occur. 
The established firm’s technology with its sunk capital cost is a mechanism by 
which the firm can sustain the aggressive market share. 
 Entry is positively associated with export orientation, market size dispersion and 
labor productivity. It is negatively associated to profit rate. It seems that the defense 
of high rents gives incumbents an incentive for ex-post retaliation. Knowledge, 
about this probably leads to a situation where high profits do not lead to new entry. 
Labor growth rate and production dispersion within firms deterred exit. 
 Tables  4. 10 and  4. 11 show also the results under the simultaneity hypothesis. 
Model 2 as cited by  Evans and Siegfried  (1992) is “ looking for an explanation of 
residual entry, over and above that which is determined by exit, and residual exit, 
exceeding that which is determined by entry .” The estimates support the existence 
of displacement replacement effects and do not reveal any hint of symmetry in any 
explanatory variables. 
 From the goodness-of-fit measures (in the bottom rows of Tables 3.1 and 3.2), 
the explanatory power of the model is relatively high with an adjusted R squared 
ranging between 53 and 71%. The statistical significance of the interaction effect 
between entry and exit suggests that Model 2 is indeed the best specification. 
Accordingly, the estimates from this model should be considered as the basis for 
the comparisons with other studies. 5
 4.5  Turnover, Economic Performance, and Productivity 
 The theory attached to firms’ turnover goes back to Schumpeter. His theory is that 
growth, innovation and business dynamics are inherently connected and the econ-
omy develops through a process of competition and selection. Firms gain an 
advantage through innovation. In this way, they achieve excess profit which 
encourages imitation and entry. As a result, profits drop and the firms are stimu-
lated to innovate again. As not all firms have the abilities to innovate, selection 
occurs. From this point of view, the entry of new firms is essential because entrants 
bring with them new ideas, methods and products. The exit of some firms is 
equally important, because the majority of these firms show bad performances and 
do no longer contribute to the growth of the economy. Furthermore, exit of firms 
creates room for new entries. Accordingly, Schumpeter states that a high level of 
turnover of firms contributes to economic growth because of its contribution to 
selection and innovation. 
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 The purpose of this forth section is to investigate using a panel of manufacturing 
industry data for the years 1996 up to and including 2004 whether entry and exit of 
firms affect performance and labor productivity. 
 4.5.1  Impact of Entry and Exit Rates on Economic Performance 
 Many studies dealing with the impact of firm entry and exit on economic performance, 
focus on the relationship between firm entry and exit and productivity growth. 
Scarpetta et al.  (2002) studied several OECD countries; the empirical results show 
significant differences in the contributions of entry to aggregate productivity. For 
the European countries, firm entry has a positive contribution to growth, but the 
effect is small, whereas in US, firm entry has a negative impact on growth. 
However, the results are unanimous for the impact of the firm exit, in the sense that 
the exit of low productivity firms has a positive impact on aggregate growth. The 
authors argue that the results may differ according to whether the economic perfor-
mance indicator is measured by TFP or Labor productivity. Besides,  Cincera and 
Galgau  (2005) argues that the entry and exit of firms has an impact on both the level 
and the growth rate of total factor productivity. 
 In the present study, we concentrate on the main findings on the impact of the 
entry and exit rates on economic performance as measured by the growth of 
output. Consequently, we will run an extended Cobb–Douglas function, defined 
as follows:
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 where  i = 1…15 ,  t = 1997–2005. 
 Y, K, and L represent respectively value added, capital and labor in the considered 
industry. Entry rate, E, and exit rate, X, are assumed to affect the production process 
instantaneously and with lagged components. Hence, the dynamics of entry and exit 
on the production process will be considered by introducing entry and exit rates to 
the production function, according to a distributed lag model. An alternative 
specification to be tested is to introduce into the production equation, production, 
capital and labor variables in first differences rather in levels. Hence, we will have:
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 The two alternative specifications presented above, are tested using a panel data 
of 15 manufacturing industries covering the period 1995–2004. Specification (2) 
has been tested using proxies for value added, capital and labor extracted from the 
annual firm surveys covering the period 1997–2003. Thus, we use for each sector 
and for each year medians values of firm value added, capital and labor. Several 
specifications have been tested whether output and inputs variables in the production 
function have been introduced in levels or in differences and whether the heterogene-
ity across industries is supposed to be fixed or random. Our favorite results for the 
impact of firm entry and exit on output growth are reported in Table  4. 12 . 6
 We observe a negative impact of an increase in the current firm entry rate, which 
is significant at the 10% confidence level, with a 1% increase in the current entry 
rate leading to a decrease by 1.04%. 7 However, we do not find a significant relationship
between firm entry lagged by 1 and 2 years respectively. Besides, the coefficients 
of the exit rates are not significant for all the specifications. An exception concerns, 
results of specification (1) where we find that the exit rate lagged by 1 year has a 
positive impact on the production process. 
 The general policy implications that we can draw from the empirical analysis are not 
clear and do not support any economic considerations that influence entry and exit in 
 Table 4.12  Impact of entry and exit on economic performance; dependent variable lnY 
 Specification (1)  Specification (2) 
 Fixed effect model  Fixed effect model  Random effect model 
 Constant  2.95  –  −0.026 
 (4.64)  (−0.11) 
 Labor  0.37  0.93  0.93 
 (4.97)  (5.4)  (6.11) 
 Capital  0.24  0.28  0.29 
 (4.44)  (2.6)  (3.10) 
 Entry  −0.74  −1.22  −1.04 
 (−1.93)  (−1.62)  (−1.63) 
 Entry(−1)  −0.55  0.75  0.67 
 (−1.79)  (−0.95)  (1.15) 
 Entry(−2)  −0.04  –  – 
 (−0.14) 
 Exit  1.09  2.39  1.02 
 (1.17)  (1.15)  (0.65) 
 Exit(−1)  2.15  2.20  0.72 
 (2.31)  (1.11)  (1.53) 
 Exit(−2)  1.49  –  – 
 (1.57) 
 Obs  105  90  90 
 R²  0.58  0.67  0.60 
 Haussman specification test x2(6) = 1.6  p -Value 0.95 
Note : Robust  t -statistics in brackets fonts below the corresponding coefficients. 
 Specification (1) and (2) indicate that value added, capital and labor variables are introduced 
alternatively in levels or differences into the production function. 
1034 Entry, Exit, and Productivity in Tunisian Manufacturing Industries
order to improve economic performance. 8 The results obtained are not robust and stress 
the limits of the present study, which are due to data availability and measurement 
errors. Besides, estimation results may be plagued by problems of reverse causality. 
 4.5.2  Labor Productivity and Firm Turnovers 
 This section focuses on the dynamics of labor productivity in the manufacturing sector 
during the 1996–2004 period, the period for which the data are readily available. We 
analyze labor productivity, and not total factor productivity (TFP), because of two 
equally important reasons. First, labor productivity is an important macroeconomic 
indicator of earning capacity, and a reference statistical information closely followed 
by the public and policy-makers alike. Second, the data on capital stocks required to 
study TFP are not of the same good quality as the other data and exist for only a 
proportion of the firms in the sample seriously limiting the scope of the analysis. 
 Figure 4.3 and Table  4. 13 show the basic aggregate patterns using the INS 
aggregate data for the period 1984–2004. 
 Table  4. 13 reveals that value-added grew rapidly between 1996 and 2004 (7% 
in average). Capital investment also grew at a relatively fast pace (6% in aver-
age). However, growth in worker-year and value-added per worker-year has been 
modest and quite erratic during this period, at an average rate of 2% and 5% per 
year respectively. 
 As mentioned above, the purpose of this part is to investigate whether entry and 
exit of firms affects labor productivity. A model for labor productivity is developed 
and estimated using a panel of 15 manufacturing sectors data for the years 1996 up 
to and including 2004. Table  4. 14 presents averages of labor productivity. 
 To investigate the impact of firm dynamics (turnover) on productivity, the fol-
lowing equation for labor productivity is estimated:
 Fig. 4.3  Manufacturing sector, 1984–2004 growth rates (%) 
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 Firm downsizing, i.e., a reduction in the size of the firm’s labor force, is often 
rationalized as an integral part of a process of structural change that will eventually 
result in productivity gains. It is interesting then to try and confront this notion with 
our data. 
 We regressed labor productivity between 1996 and 2004 on a dummy variable 
Dummy(∆L > 0) equal to one for firms that increased their number of worker-years 
during the period, and zero for those that did not and on present and lagged  TURNOVER 
(as well as industry and temporal dummies). Table  4. 15 presents this result. 
 The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable indicates that, within the same 
industry, firms that increased their labor force experienced 2 constant Dinars lower 
productivity growth than firms that decreased their workers. 9 These results also tell 
us that firm turnovers contribute positively and significantly to the increase of labor 
productivity. 
 Table 4.13  Manufacturing sector, 1984–2004 growth rates (%) 
 Period  Worker-years  Value added  Investment  Stock of capital 
 Value added 
per worker 
 1984  0.04  0.19  0.03  0.21  0.13 
 1985  0.05  0.11  −0.23  0.26  0.06 
 1986  0.04  0.07  0.00  0.14  0.03 
 1987  0.03  0.07  0.02  0.24  0.04 
 1988  0.04  0.20  −0.04  0.09  0.16 
 1989  0.04  0.12  0.40  0.10  0.07 
 1990  0.03  0.12  0.12  0.09  0.09 
 1991  0.02  0.12  0.16  0.08  0.09 
 1992  0.03  0.11  0.03  0.10  0.08 
 1993  0.03  0.11  0.05  0.09  0.08 
 1994  0.03  0.15  0.05  0.04  0.12 
 1995  0.04  0.11  0.04  0.05  0.07 
 1996  0.03  0.08  0.10  0.10  0.04 
 1997  0.04  0.10  0.12  0.11  0.07 
 1998  0.00  0.08  0.16  0.03  0.08 
 1999  0.01  0.07  0.05  0.01  0.07 
 2000  0.07  0.08  0.09  0.13  0.01 
 2001  0.03  0.10  0.07  −0.04  0.06 
 2002  0.01  0.05  −0.05  0.04  0.03 
 2003  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.03 
 2004  0.00  0.08  0.09  0.06  0.08 
 1984–
2004 
 0.03  0.10  0.05  0.09  0.07 
 1996–
2004 
 0.02  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.05 
 Source: Authors’ calculation based on INS and IEQ aggregated data 
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 Table 4.14  Labor productivity across industries (in 1,000 Dinars), 1997–2004 
 SECTOR  Mean  Std. Dev.  Max  Min.  Obs. 
 Food industries  1.81  0.20  2.07  1.47  8 
 Textile industries  0.44  0.31  1.02  0.25  8 
 Clothing and lining industries  0.81  0.22  1.15  0.57  8 
 Leather and footwear industries  1.06  0.08  1.18  0.97  8 
 Wood products  5.95  1.21  7.61  3.56  8 
 Chemical industries  2.74  0.46  3.62  2.19  8 
 Plastics material and rubber industries  1.46  0.07  1.56  1.33  8 
 Mineral non metallic products  1.37  0.14  1.70  1.22  8 
 Metallurgy  1.47  0.10  1.64  1.35  8 
 Fabricated metal products  1.12  0.09  1.28  0.98  8 
 Machinery and equipment  0.38  0.05  0.48  0.28  8 
 Paper and cardboard industries, printing 
and related support activities 
 1.12  0.14  1.28  0.94  8 
 Electrical equipment, radio and TV and 
other communications equipment, 
Measuring and medical instruments 
 0.85  0.05  0.93  0.78  8 
 Motor vehicle manufacturing, other 
transportation equipment 
 1.96  0.44  2.37  1.24  8 
 Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.37  0.07  0.49  0.30  8 
 All  1.53  1.39  7.61  0.25  120 
 Table 4.15  Labor productivity and turnover 
 Variable  Coefficient a
 CONST  0.01 
 (9.26) 
 Dummy(DL > 0)  −0.002 
 (−2.83) 
 TURNOVER  0.019 
 (3.69) 
 TURNOVER(−1)  0.02 
 (2.25) 
 Adjusted  R ²  0.94 
 Sample (adjusted): 1997–2004; Cross-sections 
included: 15 
a
 Estimation method: Panel least squares; White cross-section
standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected); Effects 
specification: Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) and 
period fixed (dummy variables);  t -statistics in parenthesis 
 One problem with modeling the consequences of turnover is the possibility 
of simultaneity: on the one hand, economic growth encourages entry, entry in 
turn has consequences for exits and, on the other hand, entries and exits affect 
economic growth. In ideal circumstances, this entire process should be modeled. 
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We chose a simple approach in this study which can be refined later. 
Nevertheless, this approach has provided reliable indications that turnover does 
affect labor productivity. 
 4.6  Conclusion 
 While there has been a profusion of theoretical work on entry and exit of firms, there 
is comparatively little empirical work in the area even for developed countries 
(Disney et al.  2003) . Firm entry and exit is a part of the market selection process, by 
which resources are reallocated within or across industries. The process of entry and 
exit influences economic performance through firms’ internal restructuring, reallo-
cation of resources among firms and changes in market shares of incumbents. It also 
induces the introduction of new technologies, thereby improving economic perfor-
mance. Unfortunately, shortage in firm demographics data in Tunisia and its coverage 
enables researchers to draw concrete inferences on firm dynamics and poses an 
important obstacle to analyzing births and deaths of enterprises. This data shortage 
necessitates the need for more effort to be done on data collection and dissemination 
for better understanding of the within-firm growth and market dynamics. 
 The major contribution of the study presented in this chapter is to circumvent 
this data shortage by merging, for the first time in Tunisia, administrative files 
based on continuous report of fiscal affiliation of firms with the register of firm 
affiliates at the National Social Security Fund (CNSS) in order to compute series 
on the number of entering (new), exiting (out of business) and total private firms 
with ten workers or more, by year and by industry over the 1996–2004 period. 
 First, the empirical findings of the chapter establish three basic stylized facts: 
a relative high firm churning in all Tunisian manufacturing sectors, firm turnover 
is principally driven by small and medium-sized firms and the creative 
destruction process is the predominant factor driving entry and exit in many 
manufacturing industries. 
 By developing a comprehensive picture of the magnitude, characteristics and 
effectiveness of the creative destruction process, the paper provides policy mak-
ers with a better understanding of the market’s selection process at the sectoral 
level. While heterogeneity in productivity is a common finding in firm-level 
micro data, the easy entry and exit of firms is necessary if these micro differences 
are to be exploited in a way that contributes to aggregate productivity growth. The 
combination of heterogeneity in productivity and easy entry and exit of firms is 
found to characterize the manufacturing sector in Tunisia. Accordingly, obstacles 
to free entry and exit slow the reallocation process and are likely to slow (labor) 
productivity growth. 
 Second, focusing on the implications that the interdependence between aggregate 
entry and exit has for the analysis of manufacturing industry dynamics in Tunisia, 
the empirical investigations revealed that:
 Industry concentration index and capital requirements constitute important •
barriers to entry. As for exits, sunk costs approximated by the average investment 
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per worker, act as barrier. However, no evidence of symmetry in the vector of 
explanatory variables is established. 
 Entry is positively associated with export orientation, market size dispersion and •
labor productivity. It is negatively associated to profit rate. It seems that the 
defense of high rents gives incumbents an incentive for ex-post retaliation. 
Knowledge about this probably leads to a situation where high profits do not 
lead to new entry. Labor growth rate and production dispersion within firms 
deterred exit. 
 Estimates also support the existence of displacement, replacement effects and do •
not reveal any hint of symmetry in any explanatory variables. 
 Finally, firm turnovers contribute positively and significantly to the increase of 
labor productivity. 
 4.7  Notes 
 1.  For more details see Morrisson and Talbi  (1996) , Murphy  (1999) , and Di 
Tommaso et al.  (2001) . 
 2.  http://www.pmi.tn/en/index.php 
 3.  In fact, the National Repertory of ﬁ rm in Tunisia is a continuous updated register 
of entry, exit and active ﬁ rms based on a mix of two administrative ﬁ les: The 
ﬁ scal annual register coming from the general direction of ﬁ scal control and the 
National quarterly register of employees taken from the CNSS. 
 4.  The coefﬁ cient of variation is used because the dispersion of size across indus-
tries is not in general independent from the average size: sectors with larger size 
also tend to display higher standard deviations. 
 5.  Even though the above methodology provides us reasonably good estimates of 
the height of the overall barriers to entry and exit it suffers from inaccuracies 
introduced by the use of the kinds of variables that proxy barriers. Moreover, the 
data available for cross section examination by itself is capable of inducing 
biases in the measure. Thus it can only be considered as a ﬁ rst step in analysing 
the extent of barriers. Added to this is the possibility of inter-industry variations 
in erecting barriers. As entry and exit are discrete and involve a time lag to 
respond to incentives, which differ across industries, a more suitable method will 
be to examine a panel of ﬁ rms across industry groups. 
 6.  Several speciﬁ cations have also been tested assuming that entry and exit rates are 
endogenous. The results obtained are not signiﬁ cant and will not be reported. 
 7.  Economic analysis on the impact of the entry and exit rates on output growth 
concern the results reported in column 2 and 3 of Table 5.1. 
 8.  Our results are in contradiction with the main findings of Cincera and 
Galgau  (2005) who find appositive correlation between entry and the growth 
of production. 
 9.  The result remains unchanged after controlling for changes in the capital stock by 
introducing a dummy variable equal 1 for ﬁ rms that increased their real investment. 
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